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Abstract. Although minority coalition has become a relatively frequent form of governance, it is often considered
politically ineffective in policy making. To obtain sufficient support in parliament, government bills must go through
the scrutiny activities initiated by coalition partners and overcome the concerns of external support parties in
opposition. By examining parliamentary scrutiny on government bills, this paper explains the surprising policy-
making effectiveness in minority coalition governments. Specifically, we argue and show that different patterns of
portfolio allocation with the specific ideological locations of the ministerial office-holder, the coalition partner and
the external supporter, structure the extent to which government bills are scrutinized in parliament, and therefore,
the effectiveness of the minority coalition on managing and implementing policies. We empirically examine bills
initiated by 256 ministries in 13 Danish minority coalitions between 1985 and 2015, and we reveal robust evidence
that corroborates our argument.
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In parliamentary democracies where multiple parties routinely rule together in coalition
governments, minority coalitions are often considered puzzling deviations from majority coalitions
(Andeweg et al. 2011). However, minority coalitions are not as rare as one would expect (Strøm
1990),1 and their presence has been more frequent than single-party minority government since
1980.2 Most interestingly, empirical research has demonstrated that minority coalitions perform
surprisingly well in policy making and are more stable than what conventional coalition theories
would predict (e.g., Cheibub et al. 2004; Field 2016; Green-Pedersen 2001; Moury & Fernandes
2018; Potrafke forthcoming; Strøm 1990). These findings suggest that minority coalitions can
implement their policy agenda in a timely manner and thus govern effectively without holding
a parliamentary majority. In this case, how minority coalitions manage to govern effectively and
stably becomes a critical yet understudied question for political scientists.
Existing research, which largely focuses on the necessity of external support, argues that policy-
making effectiveness and governing stability of minority governments are conditional on their
ability to build legislative alliances with opposition parties (e.g., Falcó-Gimeno & Jurado 2011;
Field 2009; Green-Pedersen 2001; Klüver & Zubek 2018; Strøm 1990). However, this literature has
paid little attention to the principal–agent problem embedded in multiparty governance, in which
coalition parties pursue different policy interests and the ministerial office-holder has informational
advantages (e.g., Anderweg 2000; Martin & Vanberg 2011; Müller 2000; Strøm 2000), which can
make minority coalition policy making more complex and difficult. Specifically, even if parties in a
minority coalition agreed on a common policy and formed a legislative alliance with an opposition
party, the ministerial office-holder can still drift from previously established agreements by drafting
bills that pursue policy interests of her own party (Laver & Shepsle 1996). Consequently, both
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the coalition partner and the external supporter have incentives to scrutinize government bills
in the policy-making process when their policy preferences diverge (e.g., Falcó-Gimeno 2014;
Kim & Loewenberg 2005; Martin & Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011; Thies 2001). These scrutiny
activities attempting to reduce informational deficits, in turn, constitute obstacles that can delay the
parliamentary policy-making process, limit the minority coalition’s ability to carry out its pledges
and ultimately make minority coalition governance less effective and more vulnerable (Matthieß
forthcoming; Thomson et al. 2017).
While governing in minority coalitions requires policy-making coordination not only among at
least two ruling parties but also with additional parties in opposition, this paper attempts to identify
the conditions that make minority coalition policy making more (or less) effective. More precisely,
our interests land on the conditions under which government bills of minority coalitions receive
less (or more) parliamentary scrutiny from coalition partners and support parties. Our argument
focuses on how different patterns of portfolio allocation—defined by the relative ideological
locations of the ministerial office-holder, the coalition partner and the external support party—
structure the extent to which government bills are scrutinized in parliament. When the environment
is uncertain for future policy making at the time of coalition formation and agreement, we examine
whether and how portfolio allocation shape the joint level of parliamentary scrutiny on government
bills, and their implications on the policy-making effectiveness of minority coalitions.
Different from prior work, which assumes that the median party occupies an advantageous
bargaining position and can facilitate minority policy making (e.g., Baron 1991; Laver & Schofield
1990; Schofield 1993; Tsebelis 2002), we argue that a minority coalition with the median party on
board creates an unbalanced policy-making structure that may amplify coalition tensions and thus
increases the level of scrutiny and reduces policy-making effectiveness. Since either the median
partner or the median minister will attempt to offer policy concessions to an external support party
closest to her to move the final policy outcome toward her own party, this configuration creates the
highest potential for one-sided policy-making bias that may result in a great deal of parliamentary
scrutiny. On the contrary, when the median party stays out of the minority coalition, it becomes a
decisive actor in parliament since it provides the necessary support in addition to its advantageous
bargaining position for implementing government bills.
Building on this structural argument, when the median party is not a coalition member, we
further distinguish three patterns of portfolio allocation in minority coalitions based on the relative
ideological locations of the ministerial office-holder, the coalition partner and the external support
party (i.e., the median party): ‘sandwiched minister’, ‘sandwiched partner’ and ‘sandwiched
median party’. Being ‘sandwiched’ means that one actor is ideologically surrounded by the other
two actors. We expect that the ‘sandwiched median’ scenario most effectively reduces the risk of
ministerial drift and makes government bills more acceptable for all three actors than those in the
other two scenarios. Because the ‘sandwiched median’ mostly guarantees the implementation of
agreement, this allocation pattern makes parliamentary scrutiny less likely and therefore enhances
the effectiveness of minority coalition policy making.
To examine our argument, we assemble a bill dataset from Denmark, an exemplary country
where governance under minority coalition frequently occurs.3 The Danish dataset contains almost
6,000 government bills from over 250 ministries in 13 minority coalitions in the period of 1985–
2015. Our descriptive statistics show that the median party is not a coalition member in 63 per
cent of all ministries and that the sandwiched median configuration occurs more frequently than
the other configurations when the median party stays in the opposition. In addition, we focus
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on two corollary measures to approximate parliamentary scrutiny. First, we study the duration
that government bills spend in the parliamentary policy-making process. Second, we examine the
number of questions bills receive in committee deliberations. Our empirical analyses reveal that, in
ministries where the sandwiched median is the case, government bills indeed experience a shorter
parliamentary review process and receive fewer committee questions than they do in the other
configurations. In other words, when the median stays out of the minority coalition and is being
sandwiched, the minority coalition tends to enjoy more effective policy-making conditions.
Moreover, we further explore two particular empirical implications of the above findings. Our
additional empirical endeavour reveals that the presence of specific portfolio allocation patterns
at the ministry level is significantly correlated with the amount of ideological divisiveness of the
minority coalition. Precisely speaking, we find that the median party is less likely to be part of the
minority coalition when intra-coalition divisiveness is present and that the likelihood of the median
party being sandwiched is higher when divisiveness within the minority coalition increases. Taking
everything together, our findings shed light on the implications of portfolio allocations for minority
coalition policy making in parliamentary democracies, and they may advance our understanding
of why minority coalitions have become more prominent than single-party minority governments.
Policy making in minority governments
Despite the scholarly findings on the long history and the frequent occurrence of minority
governments (e.g., Cheibub et al. 2004; Strøm 1990), research on why they form and how they
govern has been scant compared with that on majority governments. Moreover, in the existing
literature on minority governments, the scholarly interest has mostly focused on explaining their
formation and yet left minority policy making a relatively unexplored territory (e.g., Bergman
1993; Crombez 1996; Kalandrakis 2015; Luebbert 1986). Although this literature shows under
what conditions parties may prefer the form of minority governance over majority ruling, we
still know very little about how minority governments sustain without the majority support in
parliament (Christiansen & Pedersen 2014).
Taking a policy-seeking perspective, Strøm’s (1990) reasoning of the formation of minority
governments contends that some parties may choose to stay out of the government to avoid
potential electoral loss resulting from government participation.4 Nevertheless, these parties are
willing to trade their support in parliament with the minority government for short-term or long-
term policy benefits (e.g., Artés & Bustos 2008; Bale & Bergman 2006). This suggests that the
effectiveness of minority policy making may largely depend on the minority government’s abilities
to build legislative alliances with opposition parties in parliament.
Motivated by Strøm (1984, 1990), several scholars have investigated minority policy making
with an interest on the relationship between government and opposition parties. For instance,
Falcó-Gimeno and Jurado (2011) discover that the ideological fragmentation within the minority
government and that within the opposition determine the fiscal performance of the minority
government. Klüver and Zubek (2018) reveal that the ideological conflict between government
and opposition parties structures the ability of the minority government to take action on its policy
agenda. Most importantly, to obtain the trust and support from opposition parties, Christiansen
and Damgaard (2008) and Christiansen and Pedersen (2014) argue that the minority government
may rely on formal or informal legislative agreements to ensure its policy-making performance.
Those formally written agreements may further institutionalize minority governance as ‘contract
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parliamentarism’ (Bale & Bergman 2006). In addition, Bassi (2017) contends that parties in the
minority government can distribute portfolios in ways so that the final policy output can not only
benefit the governing parties but also satisfy the policy interests of their external supporters.
Indeed, recent empirical research has shown that once parties in the minority government
reach agreements with ad hoc partners in parliament, they tend to govern well (Field 2009;
Green-Pedersen 2001). However, this body of work pays little attention to the principal–agent
problem that occurs when minority policy making needs collaboration between the coalition and
opposition parties (e.g., Andeweg 2000; Müller 2000; Strøm 2000). Specifically, in multiparty
(majority and minority) governments, ministerial office-holders have an informational advantage
and discretionary power over their portfolios,5 and these privileges allow them to draft bills in the
shapes they prefer (Laver & Shepsle 1996). Also, the electoral incentives to pursue policies of
their own party make the ministerial office-holders likely to betray the agreements they made
with their coalition partners, particularly when policy preferences of coalition parties diverge.
In response, coalition partners are motivated to employ political institutions to scrutinize and
eventually challenge the proposals made by ministerial parties to prevent potential promise-
breaking behaviour (e.g., Carroll & Cox 2012; Indridason & Kristinsson 2013; Kim & Loewenberg
2005; Lipsmeyer & Pierce 2011; Thies 2001).6 Importantly, through monitoring and amending
proposals initiated by the ministerial office-holder in parliament, coalition partners can ameliorate
the principal–agent problem by reducing their informational deficits and ultimately implementing
previously agreed policies (Martin & Vanberg 2011, 2014).
Unlike majority coalitions, minority coalitions are known for the need for external support
from opposition parties in parliament. Motivated by potential drifting behaviour of ministerial
office-holders, external supporters of the minority coalition should possess as much incentive
as coalition partners to scrutinize government bills to protect their own policy benefits (Strøm
1990), particularly when their policy preference deviates from that of the ministerial party. In
theory, this suggests that policy making in minority coalitions would be more difficult than
that in majority coalitions since both coalition partners and external supporters are motivated to
engage in scrutinizing and challenging ministerial proposals to protect their own policy benefits.
Excessive parliamentary oversight can potentially hinder a minority coalition from implementing
policies, which may further impose considerable electoral costs on coalition parties (Martin
2004; Matthieß forthcoming). However, contradictory empirical findings, which demonstrate that
minority coalitions have similar policy-making effectiveness to majority coalitions (Cheibub et al.
2004; Strøm 1990), suggest that an explanation for how minority coalitions can rule effectively
and successfully is warranted.
Portfolio allocation patterns and policy-making effectiveness in minority coalitions
In her recent work, Bassi (2017) contends that ruling parties in the minority government can
distribute portfolios strategically to make multiparty policy making robust against defections from
either ruling partners or external supporters. Specifically, since how portfolios are allocated shapes
the final policy outcome of the government, ruling parties may choose an allocation pattern, which
results in a specific set of government policies, that not only maximizes their own policy benefits
but also satisfies policy preferences of their external supporters.7 Building on this perspective,
we propose to study minority coalition policy making by investigating the potential effects that
different patterns of ministerial portfolio allocation exert on the interactions between the ministerial
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Figure 1. Portfolio allocation and its policy-making implications in minority coalitions: When the median party is
a cabinet member.
Note: The direction of arrows indicates the actors who initiate scrutiny, and the length of arrows represent the levels
of scrutiny a government bill may receive.
office-holder, the coalition partner and the external supporter in the parliamentary policy-making
process.8
Our argument, following the literature on policy making in multiparty governments (Martin &
Vanberg 2005, 2011), centres on how the risk of ministerial drift motivates both coalition partners
and external supporters to scrutinize government bills in the parliamentary policy-making process
and how distributing portfolios in different patterns conditions these actors’ incentives to engage
in parliamentary oversight. In other words, our primary interest lands on the relationship between
portfolio allocation patterns and the extent to which government bills are scrutinized in the policy-
making process (i.e., minority policy-making effectiveness).
Although we are interested in how the ministerial office-holder, the coalition partner, and the
external supporter interact in the minority policy-making process, we consider the parliamentary
median party the most critical candidate for being an external supporter in our theoretical
model. Since minority governance is more policy-seeking oriented (Strøm 1990) and minority
governments can hardly offer office benefits (Bale & Bergman 2006), parties in minority coalitions
have great incentives to build a parliamentary majority with a party that can provide not only
additional legislative support but also bargaining leverage over policies. When the median party is
not a government member, given its pivotal position in the policy space (Tsebelis 2002), it provides
parties in the minority coalition exactly what they want for carrying out their policy agenda. Yet,
when the median party joins the minority coalition in the first place, either taking the ministerial
office or serving as the coalition partner, the very need for additional supporters in parliament
can make the implementation of minority coalition policies more complex. Figure 1 depicts our
conjecture.
As illustrated in Figure 1, while the minority coalition holding the median position can choose
between an external supporter from either side, this policy-making choice is likely to come to the
benefit of either the ministerial median party or the coalition median partner. Specifically, instead
of sticking with the coalition agreement that is likely to be located between the two coalition
parties, both the median partner and the median minister have incentives to move the final policy
outcome close to themselves. They can profit from offering necessary policy concessions to the
closest external party for building a legislative alliance. In the end, this situation may encourage
more scrutiny activities initiated by parties from both sides as they all fear policy drift at their
expense. For instance, if the minority coalition forms an alliance with the external party located
to the right, the partner (being median or not) and the external party on the right will monitor the
minister to prevent her from drifting, while the opposition party on the left will also scrutinize
ministerial bills to ensure a final policy outcome close to the left.9
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Figure 2. Portfolio allocation and its policy-making implications in minority coalitions: When the median party is
not a cabinet member.
Note: The direction of arrows indicates the actors who initiate scrutiny, and the length of arrows represent the levels
of scrutiny a government bill may receive.
Put it differently, although the median party controls an advantageous position in policy
bargaining and forming a government with the median can be beneficial (Baron 1991; Laver &
Schofield 1990; Tsebelis 2002), we expect that holding this position within the minority coalition
is likely to make the principal–agent problem worse. It essentially motivates all parties involved in
policy making to engage in parliamentary scrutiny and thus reduces the effectiveness of minority
coalition policy making. This situation can get even worse when divisiveness of coalition parties
increases, as the incentives to monitor and challenge ministerial proposals increase. The above
discussion leads to our first hypothesis.
H1: All else being equal, policy making in the minority coalition is less effective when the
median party is a coalition member than when it stays out of the coalition.
Now, when the median party stays out in the opposition as the external supporter, we can further
distinguish three specific patterns of portfolio allocation under minority coalitions: the sandwiched
minister, the sandwiched partner and the sandwiched median, as illustrated in Figure 2.
The upper panel in Figure 2 presents the situation where the ministerial office-holder is
ideologically surrounded by her coalition partner and the median party (i.e., the external supporter).
One possibility in this scenario is that the office-holder can autonomously draft a bill to her own
favour and the coalition partner will approve the bill without scrutinizing it, as the partner believes
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that the ministerial proposal is constrained by the median party. However, as Martin and Vanberg
(2011: 22) show, this only holds in situations where divisiveness of coalition parties is sufficiently
small. As soon as this conflict escalates, both the coalition partner and the median party have
strong incentives to monitor the minister and her bills to avoid agency loss resulting from potential
ministerial drift. As prior work on coalition governance indicates, the coalition partner eventually
scrutinizes and challenges the minister in parliament because she prefers the implementation of
the coalition compromise (likely to be located between the minister and the partner). Besides, the
median party expects the implementation of the legislative agreement she made with the minority
coalition as a whole (likely to be located to the left of the minister). In other words, both the partner
and the median party are motivated to keep tabs on the minister. Consequently, parliamentary
scrutiny from different directions makes the policy-making process lengthy and less effective.
The middle panel in Figure 2 shows another pattern where the coalition partner is surrounded by
the minister and the median party. In this scenario, since the median party provides critical external
support to the minority coalition, she has a stronger incentive than the partner to scrutinize and
challenge ministerial proposals in order to enforce the implementation of a final policy outcome
that is close to her ideal point. For the coalition partner, she knows that bills will be examined by
the median party and the final policy outputs are very likely to be moved to somewhere closer to
the median party, which means the coalition policy output is likely to be closely located to her own
policy preference. As a result, her incentive to scrutinize ministerial proposals should be slightly
weaker than the sandwich minister case described above, even if the divisiveness of the coalition
presents in this scenario. Consequently, we expect that the joint degree of parliamentary scrutiny in
the sandwiched partner case should be slightly lower than that in the sandwiched minister case.10
Finally, the lower panel in Figure 2 illustrates the scenario where the median party is
ideologically surrounded by the minister and the coalition partner. We expect that the portfolio
allocation pattern can effectively ease the principal–agent problem and other difficulties parties
face in minority coalition policy making. Specifically, compared with the two scenarios described
above, the joint degree of parliamentary scrutiny initiated by the external median party and the
coalition partner should be much lower. This is because, in a sense, the median party is included
in the policy-making core of the minority coalition, which can put the median party close to the
coalition compromise on which the coalition parties have agreed upon.
When the partner initiates oversight to ensure the implementation of the agreed coalition
compromise, it signals the median party that the coalition compromise is likely to be implemented,
which further weakens her incentive to scrutinize the government bill. Similarly, when the median
party scrutinizes the bill, it also lowers the partners’ incentive to keep an eye on the minister, since
she knows that the coalition compromise is very likely to be executed. In other words, placing the
median party between coalition parties works as a heuristic that informs both the partner and the
external supporter about the likely location of the final policy outcome, which in turn enhances
their trust and facilitates the policy-making process in parliament. This expectation should also
hold when coalition divisiveness increases. Based on the discussion above, we may derive our
second hypothesis:
H2: All else being equal, when the median party stays out of the minority coalition
government, policy making is more effective in the sandwiched median scenario than that
in the other scenarios.
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Table 1. Portfolio allocation patterns in Danish minority coalitions (1985–2015)
Portfolio allocation pattern Frequency (%)
Median in government 95 (37%)
Median not in government
Sandwiched median 82 (32%)
Sandwiched partner 41 (16%)
Sandwiched minister 38 (14%)
Note: Total number of ministries is 256.
Research design and data
To evaluate our expectations, we rely on data from Denmark where political parties frequently
govern together in minority coalition governments. Minority coalition policy making, in which
ministerial office-holders are often confronted with the mistrust from both coalition partners and
external support parties, has been a regular exercise rather than an exceptional case in Denmark.
Moreover, Danish parties in minority coalitions often build legislative alliances with opposition
parties in different policy areas (Christiansen & Damgaard 2008; Green-Pedersen 2001). All
these together make Denmark an exemplary country for studying policy-making effectiveness
in minority coalitions. We assemble a dataset covering all Danish government bills initiated by
minority coalitions in the period of 1985–2015. Since almost all governments formed in this
period are minority coalitions except for the only majority coalition government led by the Social
Democrats from 1993 to 1994, this dataset allows us to test how portfolio allocation patterns
influence minority coalitions’ policy-making effectiveness. Overall, the bill dataset covers almost
6,000 bills proposed by 256 ministries in 13 minority coalitions.
Since our core argument distinguishes four scenarios of portfolio allocation in minority
coalitions, our first task is to locate the ideological positions of the ministerial party, the coalition
partner party and the external party in different policy areas for each minority coalition in the
period we study.11 For this purpose, we rely on the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset,
which documents the policy attention of political parties on a variety of issues across time.12 With
the CMP dataset, we follow Bäck et al. (2011) by attaching CMP sub-policy categories to 13
issue areas13 and employ the scaling approach developed by Lowe et al. (2011) to calculate the
ideological positions of parties on these 13 issue areas as well as the importance of those issues
to each party. This allows us to locate the area-specific ideological positions of political parties
accordingly. Once we have the information on those parties’ positions, the next task is to attach
existing issue areas to portfolios in each minority coalition covered in our sample. Here, we also
follow Bäck et al. (2011) and classify all portfolios into these 13 policy areas.14 Finally, based on
the relative positions of the ministerial party, the coalition partner party and the legislative median
party, we categorize each ministry into the four portfolio-allocation scenarios we described above.
Table 1 summarizes the frequencies of these patterns.
Our sample covers a total number of 256 ministries in 13 minority coalitions. While the
literature often emphasizes the role that the legislative median party can play in a minority
government (e.g., Schofield 1993; Tsebelis 2002), our findings on the patterns of portfolio
allocation reveal that the median party is rarely included in Danish minority coalitions. Only 37%
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of the total portfolios in our sample contain the median party as either the minister or the partner.15
On the contrary, the median party frequently stays out of government, and this pattern constitutes
more than 60% of the portfolios we investigate here. Moreover, when the median party is not a
member of the minority coalition, the median party is sandwiched (i.e., ideologically surrounded)
by the ministerial and the partner party quite commonly.
Although Table 1 seems to suggest that political parties in Denmark prefer certain patterns
of portfolio allocation over others when they govern in minority coalitions, the question of our
main interest is whether these patterns are associated with the joint level of parliamentary scrutiny.
To test the proposed relationship, we approximate policy-making effectiveness by relying on two
measures that capture the level of parliamentary scrutiny. First, we follow Schulz and König (2000)
and Martin and Vanberg (2011) by employing the length of the policy-making process as a central
indicator for the time spent for information acquisition. As monitoring activities consume time,
this variable approximates policy-making effectiveness by measuring the number of days between
the day that a bill proposal was introduced and the day that the bill was approved or removed from
parliament. The longer a bill stays in this process, the more likely the bill experiences scrutiny, and
thus the less effective the minority coalition is on implementing the bill. We collect this information
for all ministerial proposals in the period we study.
Second, following recent research on coalition oversight (e.g., Höhmann & Sieberer 2020;
Martin & Whitaker 2019; Otjes & Louwerse 2018), we conceptualize parliamentary questions as
a potential instrument that parliamentary parties use to solicit policy information from ministerial
parties in the policy-making process.16 The policy-making process is likely to be delayed when
a bill receives many inquiries in parliament, and therefore effectiveness can be deteriorated.
Furthermore, the number of questions may indicate imperfect drafting and reveal coalition
tensions, which threaten to reduce the effectiveness of minority coalitions. To explore how coalition
parties and external supporters together scrutinize those bills, we focus on the committee level and
collect the total number of questions asked by participating committee members from different
parties.17 Yet, because of data availability, we only have this information for bills initiated in the
period of 2004–2015.18
In addition to our portfolio allocation patterns (captured by several indicator variables), we
control for a set of variables that may encourage parties to scrutinize government bills and therefore
lead to a less effective policy-making process. First, the level of preference divergence within a
coalition has been demonstrated to be a decisive factor that determines how coalition parties deal
with their inherent principal–agent problems in the parliamentary policy-making process (e.g.,
Bräuninger et al. 2017; Martin & Vanberg 2011). We measure intra-coalition policy disagreements
by using the index of coalition divisiveness proposed by Martin and Vanberg (2011).19 We expect
that greater divisiveness leads to a lengthier policy-making process and provokes more questions
in committee deliberations. Second, we control for the overall saliency of a ministry in Denmark
in order to account for the potential relationship between the saliency of a ministry and the level
of parliamentary scrutiny it receives, although we do not have clear expectations. This information
is obtained from an expert survey of Druckman and Warwick (2005). Third, we control for
government size in our models. This is measured as the sum of seat shares of all coalition parties.
Theoretically, the bigger the government, the less likely it would rely on opposition parties’
support. The size of government thus conditions the influence of opposition parties on minority
policy-making effectiveness. Fourth, we include the number of government parties to account for
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Table 2. Portfolio allocation and length of parliamentary review, Cox model (1985–2015)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(All bills) (Government w/o median)
Median in government −0.169**
(0.034)
Sandwiched median 0.073+ 0.095*
(0.040) (0.048)
Sandwiched ruling partner 0.038
(0.050)
Coalition divisiveness −0.174*** −0.302*** −0.306***
(0.054) (0.075) (0.075)
Portfolio salience 4.444** 9.872** 9.917**
(0.891) (2.400) (2.408)




Number of government parties 0.003 0.068+ 0.068+
(0.026) (0.035) (0.035)
Extreme minister 0.069 0.034 0.022
(0.032) (0.041) (0.042)
Issue fixed effects V V V
Observations 5,995 4,108 4,108
Log-likelihood −4,1110.9 −2,6904.6 −2,6904.4
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
unobserved coalition dynamics. The increase in the number of coalition parties may raise the
bargaining costs within the minority coalition and may change the overall interaction between
the coalition and opposition parties. We also generate a dummy variable that indicates whether
a ministerial party holds the most extreme policy position in an issue area. We suspect that bills
initiated by an extreme minister are more likely to be scrutinized by its coalition partners as well
as its external supporters. Finally, we control for issue fixed effects.
Empirical results
Portfolio allocation and length of policy making
We first evaluate our expectations by examining the relationship between portfolio allocation
patterns and the length of the policy-making process. Since the dependent variable measures the
total number of days that a government bill stays in the parliamentary policy-making process, we
employ an event history model for our analyses. Specifically, we perform several Cox regression
models with issue area fixed effects, and the estimated results are presented in Table 2. Note that the
estimated coefficients of a Cox model are parameterized concerning the hazard rate, so a positive
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coefficient indicates a higher hazard rate, that is, a shorter survival time. On the contrary, a negative
coefficient represents a lower hazard rate and, therefore, a longer survival time.
We begin with an estimation that distinguishes the situation between whether the median party
is a member of the minority coalition. As Model 1 shows, the negative coefficient of median in
government suggests that the policy-making process is significantly longer when the median party
is a member of the minority coalition than when the median party is a member of the opposition.
Consistent with our expectation, although the median position may constitute an advantaged
bargaining position for either the ministerial or the partner party, it increases the scrutiny activities
of the non-median parties to prevent ministerial drift, which lengthens the parliamentary policy-
making process.
In Models 2 and 3, we focus on bills under the situation where the median party is not a
member of the minority coalition, and we investigate whether the sandwiched median pattern
facilitates the policy-making process under minority coalitions. In Model 2, we simply employ
the indicator variable sandwiched median and make the reference group include the sandwiched
partner and sandwiched minister cases. In Model 3, we estimate the effects of sandwiched
median and sandwiched partner and make the sandwiched minister scenario the reference group.
As demonstrated in both models, the positive coefficient of sandwiched median shows that
this particular portfolio allocation pattern reduces the duration that bills stay in parliament. In
other words, when the median party is sandwiched by the coalition partner and the minister, it
makes minority coalition policy-making significantly shorter, allowing the minority coalition to
implement bills more effectively than other patterns do. These findings are consistent with our
expectations.
To illustrate the substantive effects of the variables of our interest, we plot the survival
probabilities of bills given different portfolio allocation patterns in Figure 3, where the survival
functions are derived from Models 1 and 2 presented above. The left panel in Figure 3 shows the
estimated survival probabilities of bills given whether or not the median party is a member of the
minority coalition. When the median party stays out of the minority coalition (i.e., the solid-line),
the survival experience of bills is always shorter than when the median party is part of the minority
coalition (i.e., the dashed-line). In other words, when the median party is a coalition member,
it extends the time that the bills needed in the parliamentary policy-making process. Moreover,
the right panel depicts the estimated survival functions given whether or not the median party is
sandwiched when it stays out of the minority coalition. Although the difference is less pronounced,
bills stay relatively shorter in parliament when the median party is sandwiched (i.e., the dashed-
line) than when it is not (i.e., the solid-line). In addition to the variables of interest, we also find
that coalition divisiveness, portfolio importance, government size and number of cabinet parties
are associated with the length of the policy-making process in minority coalitions. Specifically,
consistent with the coalition governance literature (e.g., Martin & Vanberg 2005, 2011), we find
that greater coalition divisiveness significantly makes government bills stay longer in the policy-
making process, regardless of whether the median party joins the minority coalition or not. For
bills initiated from important portfolios, we find that they tend to stay shorter in parliament than
those bills initiated in less important ones. We suspect that ministers have less discretion in those
portfolios and thus receive less scrutiny as the Folketing pays more attention to bills in important
areas. Moreover, minority coalitions with more seats in parliament significantly shorten the policy-
making process since they are less likely to rely on support from external parties. Finally, the
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Figure 3. Portfolio patterns and survival probabilities.
increase in the number of coalition parties seems to reduce the duration of policy making, although
this is only the case when the median party stays out of the minority coalition.
Portfolio allocation and committee questions asked
The duration of bills is a prominent yet indirect measure approximating the interaction between
those actors involved in the parliamentary policy-making process. A more direct measure is the
total number of questions raised by members of the responsible committee for the bill. This
information documents how many questions were asked by both coalition and opposition members
during committee deliberations. The more questions a bill receives in the committee review
process, the greater level of scrutiny these parties devote to the ministerial proposal. Since the
dependent variable here is a count variable, we perform a set of negative binomial regression
models with issue fixed effects and present the estimated results in Table 3.
Unlike our duration data that covers a longer period from 1985 to 2015, the data on committee
questions is only available for bills reviewed in parliamentary committees between 2004 and
2015.20 That said, the results revealed in Table 3 seem to be consistent with what we already found
in Table 2, and most importantly, our argument. More precisely, there are two major findings
from Table 3. First, when the median party is a member of the minority coalition, bills receive
significantly more committee questions than they do when the median party stays out of the
minority coalition (i.e., Model 4), and this may result in a less effective policy-making process.
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Table 3. Portfolio allocation and committee questions, negative binomial model (2004–2015)
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(All bills) (Government w/o median)
Median in government 0.228+
(0.126)
Sandwiched median −0.478** −0.486*
(0.122) (0.156)
Sandwiched ruling partner −0.010
(0.156)
Coalition divisiveness −0.168 0.334 0.339
(0.166) (0.214) (0.211)
Portfolio salience 2.741 1.804+ 1.837
(2.904) (1.087) (1.211)




Number of government parties 0.284 1.100** 1.100**
(0.206) (0.256) (0.256)
Extreme minister 0.053 0.409** 0.411
(0.090) (0.122) (0.123)
Constant 2.792** 5.819** 5.807**
(0.853) (0.954) (0.966)
Issue fixed effects V V V
Observations 2,177 1576 1,576
Log-likelihood −7,197.5 −5,212.7 −5,212.7
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
Second, when the median is not a member of the minority coalition and when it is ideologically
surrounded by the parties of the minority coalition (i.e., Model 5 and 6), bills clearly receive fewer
questions, meaning that the policy-making effectiveness in minority coalitions is improved.
In addition to the estimated results, we illustrate the substantive effects of our findings through a
simple simulation exercise. We follow King et al.’s (2000) strategy by calculating first differences
in the predicted number of committee questions a bill would receive given different patterns of
portfolio allocation. More precisely, we first draw 1,000 simulated parameters from the models
estimated above, and then generate the mean predicted values for the patterns of our interest while
holding other variables constant at their mean values.21 Finally, we calculate the difference between
our scenarios and repeat this process 1,000 times. In the end, we obtain 1,000 simulated values of
first differences for each comparison, and we plot the distributions of these values with dashed
lines indicating the median values in Figure 4.22
The upper panel in Figure 4 plots the distribution of the estimated first differences between
whether or not the median party is part of the minority coalition. The distribution has a median
of 1.8 and its difference from zero is statistically significant (p < 0.001), which suggests that a
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Figure 4. Portfolio patterns and committee questions asked.
bill would receive almost two more questions in committee proceedings when the median party
is part of the minority coalition than when it is not. Further, the lower panel shows the distribution
of the first differences between whether or not the median party is sandwiched by the minister
and the coalition partner. As the graph reveals, a bill tends to receive three fewer questions in
the sandwiched median scenario than in other scenarios, and the difference is also statistically
significant (p < 0.001).
Overall, the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 provide supportive evidence for our argument.
When it comes to portfolio allocation in minority coalitions, different patterns resulting from
the relative ideological locations of involved actors significantly change the policy-making
effectiveness of minority coalitions in the one or the other direction.
Portfolio allocation patterns in minority coalitions
Up to this point, we have demonstrated that different patterns of portfolio allocation structure the
joint level of parliamentary scrutiny cast on government bills, which further determines the policy-
making effectiveness of minority coalitions. One follow-up question is under which conditions we
find these patterns more or less likely in minority coalitions. Put it alternatively, when parties in a
minority coalition expect that distributing portfolios in specific ways may have different impacts
on the effectiveness of future policy-making environments, what makes these parties allocate them
differently?23
© 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Political Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research
MINORITY COALITIONS: AN EFFECTIVE FORM OF MULTIPARTY GOVERNANCE? 15
Guided by research on majority coalitions, coalition divisiveness seems to be a natural
candidate that can help us explain how minority coalitions allocate portfolios on average.
Specifically, the amount of coalition divisiveness is likely to produce greater parliamentary scrutiny
and therefore a less effective policy-making process. In this vein, parties in the minority coalition
may avoid patterns that bring extra parliamentary scrutiny and make policy making much less
effective. Instead, patterns that reduce the chance of government bills being scrutinized and thus a
more effective policy-making environment should be more common.24 If this conjecture is correct,
then we should observe that the coalition divisiveness index is negatively associated with the
presence of the ‘median-in-government’ scenario and positively associated with the occurrence
of the ‘sandwiched median’ pattern.
Admittedly, this conjecture can be conceptualized as a coalition formation question. That is,
parties would prefer coalitions that reduce the level of parliamentary scrutiny and thus enhance
policy-making effectiveness. However, as we have argued, minority coalitions are formed in an
uncertain environment about future policy making. Accordingly, they do not completely and
perfectly know the level of parliamentary scrutiny, which bills of ministerial office-holders will
experience. This suggests that the patterns are more or less determined when the composition of
the coalition is fixed, in particular by the ideological positions of the coalition parties. Nevertheless,
we want to examine whether the coalition divisiveness of their ideological positions impacts the
set of portfolio allocation patterns – resulting from the formation of a minority coalition – that may
bring them the most effective policy-making environment.
To empirically examine the implications of coalition divisiveness for the set of portfolio
allocation patterns, we restructure our dataset such that the unit of analysis is the ministry of a
particular minority coalition with 256 ministries in total. We perform two simple logit models with
issue and government fixed effects.25 In the first model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous
variable indicating whether the median party is included as a member of the minority coalition.
In the second model, the dependent variable is another dummy variable that captures whether the
median party (as an external supporter) is ideologically sandwiched by the parties in the minority
coalition. The main explanatory variable is coalition divisiveness, which we have already used in
the analyses at the bill level. In addition, we include the ideological distance between coalition
compromise and the median party,26 and portfolio salience as control variables.27
The estimated results are presented in Table 4. As Model 7 shows, coalition divisiveness is
negatively associated with the median being a member of the minority coalition, meaning that
the median party is less likely to be included in the minority coalition when the level of coalition
divisiveness increases. Furthermore, as we can see from Model 8, when coalition divisiveness
increases and the median party being the external supporter, the median party is more likely to
be ‘sandwiched’ than placed in different locations. These exploratory findings provide additional
support for our major argument that having the median party on board in a minority coalition is
suboptimal, particularly when coalition divisiveness already exists among coalition parties, and
that having the median party sandwiched seems to be a pattern to easing the principal–agent
problem in the minority coalition.28
Conclusion and discussion
Up until now, policy making in minority governments has received very little scholarly attention.
The deviations between conventional expectations of how minority governments would perform
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Table 4. Coalition conflict and portfolio patterns in minority coalitions, simple logit models
Model 7 Model 8
DV = Median in government DV = Sandwich median
N = All ministries N = Government w/o median
Coalition divisiveness −1.654+ 7.207**
(0.855) (1.415)
Median-compromise distance −3.859** −7.805**
(1.449) (2.740)




Issue fixed effects V V
Govt fixed effects V V
Observations 256 159
Log-likelihood −96.29 −68.36
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
and what they actually do have raised several puzzling questions. For instance, how do parties
in minority governments govern and under what conditions do they govern effectively? Among
the few scholarly works that exist, the attention has focused mainly on the relationship between
government and opposition parties due to the need for external support (Bale & Bergman 2006;
Christiansen & Pedersen 2014; Green-Pedersen 2001; Klüver & Zubek 2018; Strøm 1990 ). This
study complements this particular literature by focusing on policy making in minority coalitions
and investigating how portfolio allocation patterns structure the policy-making interaction among
the major actors in minority coalitions, and by extension, the effectiveness of minority coalitions
on managing and implementing policies.
Our analyses reveal several interesting findings by exploring portfolio allocation patterns in
256 ministries from 13 Danish minority coalitions between 1985 and 2015. First, while the
parliamentary median party is conventionally considered essential in the policy-making process
of minority governments, we find that the median party is not always included as a member of
minority coalitions. Rather, the median party stays out of the minority coalition in about 63 per cent
of the portfolios we investigate here. Second, when the median party is not a minority coalition
member, we find that the median party is often surrounded by the coalition parties such that the
median party is sandwiched by the ministerial party and the coalition partner. This constitutes
50 per cent of the total cases when the median party is not a minority coalition member.
Our further investigation shows that these patterns actually affect the effectiveness of minority
coalition policy making. Government bills tend to face a lengthier policy-making process when
the median party is a member of the minority coalition than when it stays out of the government.
On the contrary, when the median party serves as an external support party and is sandwiched
by coalition parties, the policy-making process becomes smoother as government bills spend less
time in parliament and receive fewer questions in committee deliberations. Interestingly, while the
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explanatory power of the well-known median model has been found questionable in predicting the
policy-making dynamics in minority governments (e.g., Ganghof & Bräuninger 2006; Klüver &
Zubek 2018), our results suggest that whether the median party is a government member could
be an important factor that conditions its bargaining leverage in the policy-making process in
minority coalitions. Moreover, the findings help us explain why minority coalition policy making
can be more effective than what is conventionally considered. Nevertheless, since our empirical
investigation relies on a single-country study, work in the cross-national context is no doubt needed
in the future to explore how far our results can travel.
Finally, our major findings imply that parties in minority coalitions can allocate portfolios
to respond to an uncertain policy-making environment. Through our exploration of portfolio
allocation patterns, we find that the presence of certain patterns is associated with the level of
coalition divisiveness. Accordingly, the median party is less likely to be included as a government
member when coalition divisiveness is high. In addition, when the median party provides external
parliamentary support rather than joining the government, the increase in coalition divisiveness
makes it more likely for the median party to be ideologically surrounded by the parties of
the minority coalition. While this particular finding is encouraging, we consider our additional
empirical effort an exploratory attempt, and we understand that our empirical strategy has its
limitations. Thus, we believe more work is needed for demonstrating how parties in minority
coalitions strategically employ political institutions to promote policy making.
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Notes
1. Strøm (1990: 61) notes that minority coalitions constitute about 20% of all multiparty governments in the period
of 1945–1987 in 15 Western European countries. We further expand his study to the period of 1945–2017 with
the information provided by the ParlGov database, and we observe a very similar pattern. We summarize our
findings in Table A1 in the Supporting Information.
2. By our calculation, in the period of 1945–2017, minority coalitions constitute roughly 32% of the total number
of minority governments before 1980, yet the number goes up to about 51% after that year.
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3. Compared to a cross-country evaluation, a major advantage of our single country analysis is that it avoids the
correlation between our policy scales and country-specific error terms.
4. The cost of joining a coalition government may come from the audience cost when ministerial proposals are
challenged in the policy-making process (e.g., Martin & Vanberg 2011), or from the fact that supporters of a
party consider entering a coalition as betrayal (Fortunato 2019).
5. To accomplish the task of preparing bills, they have at their disposal a bureaucracy staffed by civil servants with
technical expertise, as well as direct and ongoing relations with interest groups, lobbyists and outside experts
that can provide relevant policy information (Martin & Vanberg 2004: 15).
6. For instance, standing committees in parliament have strong investigative powers, such as the right to schedule
hearings, call witnesses, ask questions to civil servants and office-holders, and so on. (Martin & Vanberg 2004:
17). These committees (and similar parliamentary institutions) can be used as a monitoring device by both
opposition parties (Strøm 1990:71) and parties in coalitions (Martin & Vanberg 2011).
7. In her model, ‘who gets in’ is not the only question on the bargaining table in the cabinet formation process.
Coalition parties also bargain over offices and policies. In other words, government formation and portfolio
allocation can happen simultaneously (see e.g., Bassi 2013, 2017; Diermeier & Merlo 2000; Morelli 1999).
8. Although we set up our theoretical model with a two-party minority coalition, we expect that the increase in
the number of government parties would not change our conclusion.
9. Arguably, this scenario corresponds to the ‘maximal position-taking scenario’ described by Martin and Vanberg
(2011: 23) for majority coalition policy making. The minister will always want to introduce a radical proposal
that pursues her own policy interest, regardless of whether she possesses the median position. As a result, the
coalition partner (as well as opposition parties) always wants to scrutinize the ministerial proposal.
10. In this scenario, the sandwiched partner can come at a cost of the minister as the ruling partner is likely
to become the lucky winner of minority coalition governance. As the median party will demand the
implementation of an agreed policy close to her ideal point, the partner’s policy position is more likely to
be implemented in parliament.
11. By studying only one country, it also avoids country-specific biases of our policy position scales, which can
cause serious implications for a performance study such as ours (see e.g., König et al. 2013).
12. The CMP data extracts ‘quasi-sentences’ from party programmes and codes these sentences in 56 policy
categories to capture political parties’ attention on different policy issues (for details, see Budge et al. 2001).
13. These issue areas include foreign, defence, interior, justice, finance, economy, labour, education, health,
agriculture, industry, environment and social affairs.
14. Please see Table A2 in the Supporting Information for a detailed list of ministries we classified.
15. Analyzing the coalition government dataset assembled by Martin and Stevenson (2010) reveals a very similar
pattern on the general left–right dimension. In the period of 1945–2001, a minority coalition with the median
party constitutes about 27% of the cases in all minority governments and about 36% in all minority coalitions
in Denmark.
16. We do not rule out the possibility that parliamentary questions (PQs) could be made for signaling or position-
taking purposes. Most importantly, we do want to emphasize that making PQs to communicate to voters and
employing PQs to solicit policy information from ministers should not be mutually exclusive.
17. For each bill, we obtain this information from the committee report filed by the responsible parliamentary
committee. If a bill is reviewed by multiple committees, we focus on the committee report filed by the leading
committee.
18. See Table A3 in Supporting Information for summary statistics of the two dependent variables.
19. We first calculate the absolute value of policy distance between the minister and coalition partners, and then
weight it by using the issue salience a partner puts on a given issue area and the seat share of the partner. We
then sum the salience- and seat-weighted distance measures for all minister-partner dyads within a coalition.
20. As a robustness check, we re-perform the Cox models by restricting the sample in the period of 2004–2015,
and we get very similar findings.
21. This is implemented using the package Clarify in Stata.
22. The results depicted in the upper panel are derived from Model 4, while the results in the lower panel are from
Model 5.
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23. A similar argument can be seen in the literature on bicameralism (e.g., Druckman et al. 2005; Druckman &
Thies 2002; Fortunato et al. 2013; Proksch & Slapin 2006), which contends that political parties strategically
use political institutions to promote coalition formation and policy change in the event of bicameral conflict.
24. An alternative argument could be that parties in the minority coalition get the median party on board only in
important issue areas such as economy, interior and foreign (e.g., Laver & Shepsle 1996). Yet, as illustrated
in Figure A1, it is clearly not the case in our data. The overall pattern suggests that the sandwiched median
scenario is a frequent pattern over others on these relatively important areas. In addition, as illustrated in Figure
A2, our data also suggests that the traditional area-driven portfolio allocation does not always prevail. For
instance, defence and economy are considered to be the main areas associated with the center–right party Det
Konservative Folkeparti (see, Lin et al. 2017), yet the party does not always control portfolios related to these
areas. We consider this as another piece of evidence that corroborates our argument.
25. We admit that relying on ministries as the unit of analysis is not an ideal strategy compared with focusing on
government formation opportunities (e.g., Martin & Stevenson 2001, 2010). This is because a party can only
join or stay out of a cabinet with regard to all ministries once when the government is formed. In this case, the
allocation patterns are more or less determined, and therefore coalition parties do not really have a chance to
select from different patterns. However, since the bargaining process over portfolio allocation between potential
cabinet members is practically unknown, it is almost impossible to focus on government formation opportunities
as the unit of analysis. As a result, we proceed with our current strategy as a compromise and consider it an
exploratory attempt.
26. We follow Martin and Vanberg (2014) to construct this variable. The coalition compromise is measured as a
weighted average of the coalition parties’ positions.
27. Excluding these variables yields the same findings.
28. While we cannot rule out that the relationship between the presence of specific allocation patterns and coalition
divisiveness is endogenous, we believe that something that lies between these theoretical concepts is providing
further insights into our argument. More thorough examinations of the causality will be left to the future.
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